Abstract: Using data from a unique pricing experiment, we test Vickrey's conjecture that responsive pricing can be used to smooth demand shocks. Our evidence shows that increasing the responsiveness of price to demand conditions reduces the magnitude of deviations in capacity utilization rates from a pre-determined target level. We discuss implications for the use of demand-side incentives to deal with congestible resources. JEL: D01, D12, L11, L86.
Introduction
In a seminal contribution, Vickrey (1971) introduced the concept of responsive pricing to advocate that prices should be directly linked to congestion levels, and since then economists have investigated many schemes that adjust prices in real time to reduce congestion and increase utilization rates (e.g. Harris and Raviv 1981 , Wilson 1993 , Vickrey 1994 , MacKie-Mason and Varian 1995 , Crew et al. 1995 , Borenstein 2002 , and Courty and Pagliero 2006 . As we argue soon while reviewing the literature, there is little evidence, however, that responsive pricing actually achieves its stated goals in situations where many believe it could be implemented. This paper presents some evidence from a unique pricing experiment by easyEverything, the world's largest chain of cafés offering public Internet access. easyEverything followed Vickrey's advice and directly linked instantaneous prices to congestion levels. We investigate whether consumers respond to responsive pricing and whether responsive pricing smoothes demand shocks.
To illustrate Vickrey's proposal, assume that the congestible resources is an Internet café, as in our empirical application, but one should keep in mind that the argument can easily be extended for road pricing, electricity pricing and other applications considered in the literature.
Since our focus is on demand side responses, we consider without loss of generality, a stylized and hypothetical congestion scenario that is reasonable in our case study. We follow Vickrey and assume that the resource's capacity, Q, is inflexible in the short run and there exists a reference target level of utilization, or occupancy rate in our case study, represented by Q 0 ≤Q that 'maintains the quality of service at a "satisfactory" level' (p. 339).
In the absence of responsive pricing, demand shocks generate fluctuation in occupancy around Q 0 . Under-capacity utilization takes place when occupancy is below Q 0 and congestion emerges when it is above Q 0 . Vickrey started from the premise that such fluctuations were sub-optimal, and considered the possibility to use responsive pricing to maintain realized occupancy close to the preset target Q 0 .
To achieve this objective, responsive pricing proposes to give discounts when occupancy is below Q 0 and to raise prices when occupancy is above Q 0 . In practice, the firm in our case study updates prices every 5 minutes as a function of the level of store occupancy. To illustrate, Figure 1 shows two pricing schemes in our sample. The curves specify a price for each level of occupancy q. Each curve can be written as a linear function or occupancy, p(q)= P 0 +β(q-Q 0 )
where Q 0 corresponds to the reference level of occupancy (and also the point where the two curves in Figure 1 cross), P 0 is the base level of price corresponding to level of price when occupancy is equal to Q 0 , and β measures how much price responds to deviations from Q 0 .
Consider the flatter of the two curves in Figure 1 . The price increases/decreases by 1.4FF/hour when occupancy is 10 percent above/below the target level of consumption. The more responsive curve implies a price change of 4.2FF/hour for the same deviation in occupancy. The parameter P 0 captures Vickrey's proposal to set the 'base rate on average level of activity ' (p. 339) , while the responsiveness parameter β captures the principle that 'rates go up as capacity becomes inadequate ' (p. 340) , that is, as q increases above Q 0 and down when q<Q 0 .
Responsive pricing can smooth demand shocks if consumers have some discretion over consumption decisions. In our application, consumers may choose when they join the store and how much they use the service once in the store. Consumers have an incentive to join the store during off-peak hours (since expected prices are lower). In addition, they have an incentive to check only important emails (use the service less) when the instantaneous price is high due to an unusually high demand.
A given pricing function, characterized by (Q 0 ,P 0 ,β), generates a distribution of occupancy. We propose to measure how the distribution of occupancy changes with the level of responsiveness, β, holding the level of price P 0 and the reference occupancy level Q 0 constant.
We implicitly assume that the stochastic demand environment remains the same as β changes which is realistic in our case study. If responsive pricing works, as Vickrey conjectured, we would expect that the percentiles of the distribution of occupancy should get closer to Q 0 for more responsive schemes (higher β). Stated differently, occupancy should become more predictable and the distribution of occupancy should be more compressed around Q 0 .
We test these predictions using data from one of the easyEverything Internet café. While acknowledging that out-of-home Internet access is not of direct interest to economists, we believe that our case study nonetheless provides valuable insights for several reasons. (a) A café has a fixed capacity (number of terminals) and faces demand uncertainty-two features common to many applications where congestion pricing has been proposed. (b) easyEverything has adopted Vickrey's proposal to make prices responsive to congestion levels. (c) easyEverything has experimented with different pricing regimes to investigate the properties of local demand. These exogenous variations offer a unique environment to study demand responses.
We present both non-parametric and parametric evidence consistent with Vickrey's hypothesis. Figure 2 provides a simple illustration of the impact of responsive pricing on the distribution of occupancy. Consider again the two pricing functions in Figure 1 and let Q 0 denote the point where they cross. Figure 2 plots the cumulative distribution of occupancy rates generated by these two pricing functions. The curve corresponding to the less responsive regime dominates the more responsive curve for low occupancy levels, and the reverse holds for high ones. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the two distributions are equal at Q 0 but do so for occupancy levels that are further away from Q 0 . The finding that the percentiles of the occupancy distribution generated by the more responsive curve are closer to Q 0 is consistent with the hypothesis that increasing the responsiveness parameter smoothes demand shocks. This paper investigates to what extent this result is general, aggregating information from 12 pricing functions and controlling for a number of factors.
Literature
Our evidence contributes to the empirical literature assessing the impact of pricing schemes that vary prices in real time. As argued earlier, we are not aware of any study that investigates whether responsive pricing smoothes demand shocks. A large literature in electricity markets shows that users, both business and household, respond to schemes that announce future prices in advance-for example, the prices for each hour of the following day (e.g. Herriges et al., 1993 , Aubin et al., 1995 , Taylor and Schwarz, 2000 , Patrick and Wolak, 2001 , Schwarz et al., 2002 , Taylor et al 2005 .
3 However, our work differs from the previous studies in important ways.
Firstly, previous empirical works have studied situations where prices are typically computed (on the basis of demand forecast, supply costs and other considerations) and set a day in advance. 4 These pricing rules do not introduce an immediate feedback loop between current congestion conditions and prices as suggested by Vickrey. 5 Another important point is that prices in previous empirical works may vary for reasons that are not related to congestion. This could happen, for example, if the designer uses an imperfect model to estimate future demand. If this were the case, then the central hypothesis of this work, that demand should be more predictable when price vary more, may not hold.
Secondly and related to this previous point, our case study addresses a novel empirical question. While previous studies focus on estimating price and substitution elasticities, we ask 3 For a review of experiments with real time pricing in electricity markets see Barbose et al. (2004) . 4 An exception is Brownstone et al. (2003) who study responsive pricing in traffic congestion but they estimate willingness to pay rather than the impact of responsive pricing on congestion. 5 In addition, all consumers in our case study are charged according to responsive pricing, while in most electricity study, consumers can choose between being billed according to responsive pricing and a default pre-existing pricing scheme.
whether responsive pricing can smooth demand and clear markets in response to last-minute demand shocks, as hypothesized by Vickrey.
Finally, our results are both qualitatively and quantitatively different from past ones. We find large responses compared to the literature. Taylor et al. find a net benefit to consumers of only 4% of the customer bill (p. 255). Barbose et al. (2004) also reports small response in their survey of 70 real time pricing programs and conclude that 'most RTP programs have generated modest load reductions in terms of their magnitudes' (p. ES-6). Obviously, such comparisons have to be taken with caution because our application differs in many respects.
Qualitatively, we compute the increase in price variability that has to be introduced to decrease quantity variability by a given amount. This measure, which has never been computed before, sheds some light on a central concern in the congestion pricing debates (for example, see Lindsey and Verhoef (2000) for a review of the debate in road pricing and Barbose et al. (2004) for electricity pricing). The main drawback of congestion pricing is that it may increase the risk faced by consumers significantly. We contribute to this debate by measuring the trade-off between risk (price variability) and efficient use of capacity (reduction in congestion and increase in occupancy). 6 We find that on average, a 10 percent increase in price variability leads to a reduction in occupancy variability between 2 and 6 percent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides some background information on our case study and describes the data. Section 3 discusses the empirical framework and Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 summarizes the main findings and discusses policy implications.
Internet Café and Dataset
Our data set consists of the pricing policies and the average hourly occupancy for one of the Paris stores (Paris Sebastopole) from February 22, 2001 until July 23, 2001 . During this period, store capacity remained fixed at 373 terminals, and the store's competitive environment did not change. In our sample, the store has experimented with 12 different pricing regimes (displayed in Figure 3 ). Prices are updated every 5 minutes as a function of the current occupancy level. Consumers are charged in real time the minimum of the current price and their logon price and we will soon discuss how this feature is factored in our predictions.
After the introduction of responsive pricing in a new store, the company typically experiments with different pricing functions to learn about local demand, before attempting to optimise the pricing scheme (Courty and Pagliero, 2001) . Figure 3 shows that the firm has changed both the slope and the intercept of the pricing functions. The different pricing functions provide the exogenous variability in the degree of responsiveness that is used in the estimation.
The occupancy data consists of hourly average occupancy rates for 152 days. Although
the store was open 24 hours a day, we restricted our analysis to the period between 8 a.m. and 12 p.m. because the store never used responsive pricing during night hours. Overall, our dataset consists of 2,312 hourly observations. 7 Table 1 reports summary statistics. The average occupancy rate in the sample is 0.53, with a standard deviation of 0.16. The average price is 14FF/hour, with a standard deviation of 3.8 FF/hour. Prices vary from 2 FF per hour in the early morning to over 10 FF per hour in the afternoon, when the store is typically more crowded.
or capacity management issues. Moreover, they do not document the relation between price variation and capacity utilization. 7 The raw occupancy data include breakdown periods during which the system crashed. In such events, all computers have to be restarted, and the hourly occupancy average shows a sudden A final feature of our data that will play an important role in the empirical analysis is that occupancy rate never reaches capacity in our sample. Therefore, quantity demanded equals quantity consumed and we do not have to take into account demand rationing in estimating the impact on responsive pricing of the distribution of occupancy rates.
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Should consumers respond to responsive pricing? Table 1 shows that prices vary within and across regimes. The standard deviation presented in the last column corresponds to the variability in average hourly price that a consumer would face if she joined the store at a random hour (where each hour is weighted by average total consumption) every day and uses the service for one hour. These standard deviations capture the fact that prices vary systematically over the day cycle and also that they drop. Using an additional data set on downtime periods, we removed all corresponding observations. 8 Discussion with company indicates that the initial capacity was set too high relative to demand. The company eventually had to change pricing strategy and layout of the store because they could 8 are to some extent unpredictable at a given hour. These two sources of price variation should
give consumers an incentive to adjust their consumption decisions through different channels:
(1) Consumers can plan in advance---chose when they join store and how much to consume---on the basis of the expected daily price cycle and other predictable demand shifters.
9
For example, consumers have an incentive to substitute to cheaper hours and consume more during these hours if there is a price differential between peak and off-peak hours.
(2) Consumers have an incentive to adjust length of stay once they arrive at the store and find out the realized price. First, realized prices will typically be different from expected ones. About 7 percent of the price variance in our sample (corresponding to approximately 25 percent in terms of standard deviation) cannot be explained by a regime specific daily price cycle. 10 Second, prices may change in unexpected ways and consumers have an incentive to increase length of stay in the event prices decrease.
The price cap moderates the incentive to reduce length of stay in the event the instantaneous price increases. Due to the price cap, only new consumers have an incentive to consume less when the price increases. When the price decreases, however, all consumers have an incentive to consume more. The changes in the pricing curves generated significant differences in the level of price variability. We formally test and reject the hypothesis of equal price variability across regimes for most pair wise comparisons. We expect that consumers should respond to these changes through the two different response channels.
11 not both keep occupancy at high levels while maintaining prices above a level that would cover average costs. 9 The demand for Internet access shows strong seasonality. Occupancy changes systematically across hours of the day and to a less extent days of the week. 10 Assuming that additional variables (such as day of the week and National Holiday fixed effects) are used by consumers to predict prices reduces only very marginally the amount of unpredictable price variability. 11 The tests of the equality of variance across regimes are reported in an Additional Material Section available at http://www.iue.it/Personal/Courty/.
The magnitude of price variability in our sample is in line with other studies. The expected absolute difference for two hours selected at random in our sample is 30 percent of the average price. Studying price dispersion in the US airline industry, Borenstein and Rose (1994) find that the expected absolute difference in fares between two passengers for a given carrier and route is 36 percent of the mean fare. The mean absolute deviation from the average price in the sample is 0.27 of the average price. For comparison, Kahneman et al. (1986) We test whether the demand mechanism assumed in Vickrey's proposal actually operates in practice.
Empirical Framework
A given pricing function, characterized by (Q 0 ,P 0 ,β), generates a distribution of occupancy rates F(q|Q 0 ,P 0 ,β). Let
represent the j th percentile of the distribution of occupancy under pricing scheme (Q 0 ,P 0 ,β).
Vickrey's conjecture can be expressed as follow. Holding (Q 0 ,P 0 ) constant, the percentile k
should not depend on β. In fact, the price is independent of β when capacity 
To understand H 0 , it is useful to consider two benchmark demand systems that can be interpreted as simplified versions of channel 1 and 2 responses introduced earlier. Assume that consumers either consume one hour or nothing and that they have heterogeneous valuation for consumption. To illustrate channel 1 response assume that n h consumers walk by the store in hour h=1..H. Under this simple demand specification, the demand for Internet access depends only on the hour of the day and on the price per hour: for hour h, the subset of n h consumer who value consumption more than the posted price consume. Equilibrium occupancy in hour h takes place at the point where the downward sloping hour h demand meets the upward sloping pricing curve. As β increases, the intersection point moves closer to Q 0 and H 0 holds.
To illustrate channel 2 response, assume that a random number of consumers join the store every hour and each consumer decides whether to consume based of the realized price.
The resulting demand depends only on the price per hour and on some random state of nature ω. Equilibrium occupancy in state ω takes place at the point where the (downward sloping) state ω demand meets the (upward sloping) pricing curve. As β increases, the intersection point moves closer to Q 0 and H 0 follows (Courty and Pagliero, 2006 or not in the real world is an empirical issue.
Conditional Responses
If a large component of demand variation is due to day cycle demand fluctuations and other predictable demand shifters, which is the case in our case study, then hypothesis H 0 captures to a large extent reduction in occupancy variations caused by channel one response.
This evidence alone does not give a sense of whether channel two response plays a role. One may question whether the distribution of occupancy conditional on observable demand shifters, such as hour of the day, day of the week and so on, also gets more compressed for more responsive regimes. Denoting q' j (Q 0 ,P 0 ,β|h,X) the j th percentile of the distribution of occupancy conditional on hour h and other demand shifters summarized by X, hypothesis H 0
Focusing on conditional distributions eliminates the reduction in day cycle variation (channel one response) and focuses on reduction in occupancy variations that are driven by channel two response.
Estimation and Results
We provide both non-parametric and parametric evidence supporting hypothesis H 0 and due to data constraints only parametric evidence for hypothesis H 0,h . Depending on the test under consideration, we only report evidence for a subset of 5 or 6 percentiles to balance conciseness and completeness. The results generalize when we consider more quantiles or alternative specifications (Section 4.3). We also sometimes refer to further robustness checks, which do not add extra insight, and are available in a separate Additional Material Section.
Non-Parametric Test of H 0 for Pairs of Pricing Rules
In the introduction, we compared the cumulative distribution functions of regimes 8 and The non-parametric approach proceeds in three steps. First, select a pair of regimes, x and y, where regime x is more responsive than regime y (β x >β y ) and set Q 0  and P 0 equal to the coordinates of the intersection point of the two pricing functions. Second, compute the percentiles of the occupancy distribution under the two regimes q' j (P 0 , Q 0 , β x ) and q' j (P 0 , Q 0 , β y ). Finally, using the definition of percentile k ( 0 Q q k = ), test whether the differences in estimated percentiles have the predicted sign under H 0 ,
and whether they are statistically significant.
There are many pairs of curves in our sample, and for some pairs the difference in responsiveness is small. To address this problem, we compare all pairs of pricing functions for which the difference in slope is higher than 22. This singles out 11 pairs: regimes 1 to 9 crossed with regime 12, and regimes 10 and 11 crossed with regime 1. Each pricing function in our sample is represented at least once. These pairs of pricing functions cross between 8 percent and 33 percent of capacity. The average crossing point is 20 percent. (8, 12) and (7, 12) respectively. In both cases, the two cdfs cross around Q 0 and the cdf corresponding to the more responsive regime is dominated by (dominates) the cdf corresponding to the less responsive regime on the left (right) of Q 0 .
Test of H np 0
We proceed to test whether the patterns displayed on Figure 4 are statistically different.
We jointly estimate the percentiles of the occupancy distribution for each regime. Define the j th percentile of the occupancy distribution in regime r as
where d(r) is a dummy variable for regime r (regime 1 is excluded) and b 0,j and b r,j are coefficients to be estimated. We jointly estimate (2) for the 5 th percentile and the nine deciles using the standard Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) method (Koenker and Basset 1978 and Koenker 2005 ). 13 We test hypothesis H The estimated coefficients minimize the absolute weighted difference between the observed occupancy rates in regime r, q i,r , and the occupancy percentile q' j (r): where I(.) is the indicator function and q' j (r) is defined in (2). Each deviation q i,r -q' j (r) is weighted differently according to its sign and the quantile being estimated. We use the linear programming algorithm of Armstrong et al. (1979) to solve the minimization problem and we obtain the variance-covariance matrix of the estimators following the bootstrap resampling procedure described in Rogers (1992). 14 The two cumulative distributions should cross only once and at the same point where the two corresponding pricing curves cross. We test and cannot reject these hypotheses in our sample. 15 If x=1, then the relevant hypothesis to test is b y,j <0 if j<k and b y,j >0 if j>k. Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients b 0,j and b r,j in (2). The F-tests for the equality of the deciles across regimes are reported in Table 3 . Tables 2 and 3 should be read together with Figure 4 . As an illustration, consider Panel 2 in Figure 4 , which plots regime 2 and 12. Then select on the vertical axis a level at which the two empirical cdfs will be compared, for example 0.3. In other words, we want to compare the 3rd deciles of the two occupancy distributions. Table 2 says that the estimated 3rd decile of the occupancy distribution in regime 2 is equal to 55.89 percent (61.58-5.69), while the same decile for regime 12 is equal to 40.14 percent (61.58-21.44 ). This is consistent with Figure 4 since 55.89>40.14. Are these two deciles significantly different from each other? Table 3 (third row and first column) reports the F-test using the estimates of the quantile regression. They are indeed different at 1 percent confidence level.
In general, for deciles sufficiently far away from Q 0 , the differences displayed in Figure   2 and 4 are statistically significant. Since Q 0 is relatively small in our sample, we also provide the results for the 5th percentile. This allows testing the effect of changes in slope on the left tail of the occupancy distribution. For the pairs of regimes (7, 12) and (8, 12) , where Q 0 is highest, the difference between the 5th percentiles of the two regimes has the predicted sign (Figure 4, Panel 7 and 8) and is significantly different from zero (Table 3) .
Aggregate measure of the impact of responsive pricing
Different metrics demonstrate that responsive pricing reduces inefficiencies. Define the average level of congestion as
. 16 Note that this concept of congestion is purely hypothetical since excess demand never takes place in our case study. What we mean to capture is the average excess
demand that would take place under the assumption that Q 0 was the target occupancy level. 
corresponds to the average deviation from the preset target Q 0 that would be observed by someone who randomly joined the store, and it is interpreted as an overall measure of inefficiency.
Empirically, we use the estimates reported in Table 2 to compute D q (β) = (1/10)Σ j |q j (Q 0 ,P 0 ,β)-
To construct a measure of the impact of responsiveness, consider a change in the responsiveness from β to β' . The magnitude of the impact of the increase in responsiveness on 17 Since the responsiveness parameter β is measured in a unit that is difficult to interpret economically (FF/%occupancy), we do not report elasticities.
unused capacity ΔD q,-is 51 and 44 percent for these two pair wise comparisons. The reduction in average congestion is 23 and 30 percent respectively.
Parametric Test of H 0 and H 0,h Based on Quantile Regressions
A pricing function can be written as p(q)=(P 0 -βQ 0 )+βq and therefore varies in only two dimensions, its level (P 0 -βQ 0 ) and its responsiveness (β). For estimation purposes, we can arbitrarily fix Q 0 in (1) and rewrite q j as q'' j (P 0 ,β|Q 0 ).
Relation (3) describes how percentile j depends on the reference price P 0 (corresponding to the level of price at Q 0 ) and on the responsiveness parameter β. Therefore, H 0 simplifies to
Taking a linear approximation, we obtain q'' j (P 0 ,β|Q 0 )=a 0,j +a 1,j P 0 +a 2,j β.
We estimate the parameters a 0,j , a 1,j and a 2,j for the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th and 90th percentiles.
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The choice of Q 0 is arbitrary. In the core of the analysis, we set the reference occupancy point at Q 0 =0.28, which corresponds to the occupancy rate at which the pricing functions in regime 6
and 10 cross (Q 0 =0.28, P 0 =9.8 FF/hour). We will refer to these two regimes to illustrate the sign and magnitude of the estimated effects. We show in the next section that our results are robust to the choice of Q 0 .
Having the estimated coefficients a 2,j , we can proceed to test our main hypothesis. Using percentile k defined earlier ( 
Unconditional distribution
The estimated coefficients a 0,j , a 1,j and a 2,j of (4) are reported in Table 4 . To provide a visual display of the impact of β on the occupancy distribution, Figure 5 plots the simulated 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th and 90th percentiles using the estimated parameters from Table 4 We solve the analogous minimization problem as before
where and q i denotes hourly observations of the occupancy rate in the store. 19 An additional complication arises with the determination of k. In theory, k should be independent of β. Given our linear approximation, k solves Q 0 = a 0,k +a 1,k P 0 +a 2,k β, and it obviously depends on β (because the non-linear terms in P 0 and β are missing). This is not a problem Consistently with Vickrey's conjecture, the impact of responsiveness (a 2,0.1 ) is not significantly different from zero (Table 4 , column 1). To the contrary, the coefficient a 2,0.9 , in column 5, is negative and significant. Increasing the responsiveness parameter from 16 to 34, corresponding to a change from regime 6 to regime 10, implies a decrease of 3 percentage points for the 9th decile. The difference in the estimated parameters is significantly different from zero.
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As before, ΔD q (β) provides a measure of the overall effect of changes in responsiveness. Given the estimated coefficients in Table 4 , the difference in slope between regime 6 and 10 implies a 13% change in the average distance from the target occupancy (ΔD q =0.13).
21

Conditional distribution
To isolate the effect of channel 1 and 2, we now consider the impact of changing β on the conditional occupancy distribution. We estimate a modified version of (4), q' j (P 0 ,β|Q 0 ,h)=a 0,j +a 1,j,h P 0 +a 2,j,h β+Xa 3,j
where the matrix of regressors X includes hour fixed effects, day-of-week fixed effects, holiday effects, and weekend-cycle effects (hour dummies for Saturday and Sunday) which are proxies for predictable demand changes. We also allow for hour-specific responsiveness and price level effects.
The results are illustrated in Figure 6 , which reproduces Figure 5 for a subset of hours. Table 5 reports the coefficients a 2,j,h capturing the effect of increasing the responsiveness because k=0.1 falls within the range of k that solve
for any slope within the range observed in our sample. 20 We estimate the full variance covariance matrix of the estimators; therefore it is possible to test restrictions on coefficients across different quantiles. In this case, β 0.9 -β 0.1 = -0.229, F(1,2309)=7.90 with a P-value equal to 0.005. 21 This figure is consistent with previous results. The difference in responsiveness between regime 6 and 10 is smaller than the corresponding difference for any of the pairs considered in Section 4.1. Therefore the impact on our measure of inefficiency is smaller.
parameter on a given percentile (columns) at a given hour (lines). We investigate H p 0,h separately for h=8am,…11pm. Table 5 . Q 0 is located around the 9 th decile of the occupancy distribution. Therefore, an increase in β gives discounts in most deciles. As expected, in Figure   6 , the 9 th decile does not respond to a change in β while all others increase. Inspection of Table 5 confirms that all deciles lower than the 9 th increase and the increase is significant for the 3 rd and 5 th deciles. Increasing the responsiveness parameter from 16 to 34, corresponding to a change from regime 6 to 10, implies a significant 1-percentage point reduction in the distance between the 1st and the 9th decile.
The distribution of occupancy at 9am gives a slightly different story ( Figure 6 , Panel 2), because demand at 9am is on average higher (occupancy typically increase in our store throughout the morning and consumption reaches its peak in the afternoon). Q 0 lies now within the support of the distribution of occupancy, not far from the median. An increase in the responsiveness parameter offers discounts in the 1 st and 3 rd deciles and increases prices in the 7 th and 9 th deciles. As expected, the 1 st and 3 rd deciles increase while the 7 th and 9 th deciles decrease and the change is significant in the last case. Coefficients in Table 5 can be used to compute the magnitude of a change in responsiveness. Increasing the responsiveness parameter from 16 to 34, decreases the distance between the 1st and the 9th decile by 3 percentage points.
From 10am onwards demand increases even further and Q 0 lies to the left of the support of the distribution of occupancy. An increase in the responsiveness parameter increases prices in all states of the world and the quantiles of the occupancy distribution decrease as predicted.
The decrease is significant for most deciles and hours.
Hypothesis H p 0,h implies that any two deciles located on different sides of Q 0 should move closer to one another as the responsiveness parameter increases, and the evidence is consistent with this prediction. Although H p 0,h does not say anything when the two deciles lie on the same side of Q 0 . Interestingly, Figure 6 shows that they often move closer to one
another. An increase in the responsiveness parameter decreases the distance between deciles in addition to moving all deciles closer to Q 0 . Both effects imply that the distribution of occupancy tends to become more compressed.
The magnitude of the response to changes in responsiveness, for hour h, can be measured by ΔD q h (β). Given the estimated coefficients in Table 5 and 28%.
To summarize, conditioning on hour and other variables eliminates the impact of type one responses. Still, we find that the conditional distribution of demand becomes more compressed as responsiveness increases and the magnitude of the response is large. This implies that consumers respond to price changes that cannot be predicted by the econometrician, and that are likely to be discovered by consumers only in the last minute.
Robustness
We show that the results presented in Section 4.2 do not depend on the choice of the reference point Q 0 . We select reference occupancy rates Q 0 that fall within the range in which the pricing functions in our sample cross. Figure 3 shows that most pricing functions intercept at relatively low levels of occupancy rates. As discussed earlier, the 11 pairs of pricing functions with the highest difference in slope cross between 8 and 33 percent of capacity, with only two crossing points below 12 and above 28 percent.
The analysis presented in subsection 4.2 assumed Q 0 =0.28. In this section, we estimate (4) using Q 0 =0.20, which corresponds to the mean crossing point, and Q 0 =0.12. As before, we illustrate our results by simulating the quantiles of the distribution as the responsiveness of the pricing function changes. Figures 7 and 8 reproduce Figure 5 using our new estimates with Q 0 =0.20 and Q 0 =0.12. We set P 0 =7.6, so that the pair (Q 0 , P 0 ) corresponds to the intersection of the pricing functions in regime 5 and 12. When using Q 0 =0.12, we set P 0 =4.2, so that (Q 0 , P 0 ) corresponds to the intersection of the pricing functions in regime 1 and 12. Again, these choices are somewhat arbitrary but the conclusions would not change as long as (Q 0 , P 0 ) falls within the range of crossing points in our sample.
Using these new reference occupancy levels, all deciles of the occupancy distribution are above Q 0 . According to Vickrey's conjecture, increasing the responsiveness of the pricing function should have a negative impact on all deciles. Figure 7 and 8 are perfectly consistent with this hypothesis.
We also replicate the analysis for the conditional occupancy distribution and we find that the results are robust to the choice of Q 0 and P 0 . In addition, we repeat our analysis including in (4) and (5) a linear and quadratic time trend. The overall results are not affected.
The impact of changes in responsiveness is significant for quantiles sufficiently far away from Q 0 and a significant compression effect occurs. All the estimated coefficients and the corresponding figures for these robustness tests are reported in the Additional Material Section.
Discussion
While the benefits from responsive pricing derive from a reduction in the variability of capacity utilization, an important drawback of responsive pricing is that it increases price variability. This drawback has received much attention both in the theoretical and applied literature. For example, a large literature has argued that fairness norms influence consumer decisions and has conjectured that prices should not respond to demand shocks because this would alienate or antagonize consumers (e.g. Okun 1981 , Kahneman et al 1986 . Similarly, studies in transportation, electricity and other applications have pointed out that the introduction of price variations, and the magnitude of such variations, is a central reason for the resistance to congestion pricing (e.g. Lindsey and Verhoef (2000) , Barbose et al. (2004) ).
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A contribution of our case study to this debate is to quantify the trade off between efficiency gain (reduced congestion and idle capacity) and increases in price variability. Define the arc elasticity of reduction in occupancy deviation to increases in price variability as
where
is a measure of absolute price deviation: D p (β)=∫ 0 100 |p(q i (Q 0 ,P 0 ,β),β) -p(Q 0 ,β)|di, with p(q,β)= (P 0 -βQ 0 )+βq. The larger ε q,p the more likely that there will be resistance to the introduction to congestion pricing.
Given that we have estimates for 10 quantiles (Section 4.1, Table 2 ), we compute
We then obtain ε q,p for the11 pair wise comparisons between regimes discussed above. The resulting elasticities range between 0.2 and 0.6. This implies that, on average, a 10 percent increase in price variability leads to reduction in occupancy variability between 2 and 6 percent. Similar results are obtained with D p (β) and D q (β) obtained using the results of Section 4.2.
To illustrate the magnitude of the absolute variability in both occupancy and price, we compare regime 1 and 12. The average absolute deviation of occupancy rate from Q 0 is 47% and 31% respectively for regime 1 and 12 (see also Figure 4 , panel 1), or 175 and 115 terminals respectively. The average absolute deviation of price from P 0 is 5FF and 13FF respectively.
The resulting arc elasticity ε q,p is 0.4.
To put this figure into perspective, note that the magnitude of the amount of price variations is large but not extraordinary. In fact, recall that the amount of price variations in our case study is of the same order of magnitude as the amount of price variation observed in the airline industry (Borenstein and Rose 1994) or presented in the survey scenarios used to assess consumer fairness attitudes (Kahneman et al, 1986) . To conclude, these figures indicate that in our case study large efficiency gains could be captured by varying prices within a range of magnitude that is practiced in some industries.
Conclusions
We find that the distribution of occupancy is more compressed for more responsive pricing regimes. We interpret this result as consumers responding to responsive pricing and conclude that responsive pricing can smooth demand.
This research is not without limitations. To start, our study of responsive pricing focuses on a specific environment. Our evidence suggests that it should be possible to design a scheme that maintains occupancy level close to a given level in our case study but it is not clear whether responsive pricing would also smooth demand in a different context with a different set of consumers. A second concern with our results is that there could exist other responses to responsive pricing that do not appear when one considers only compression of the distribution of occupancy as we do in this study. For example, the use of responsive pricing may deter some consumers from returning to the store. The overall distribution of occupancy may shift to the left. We investigate this issue in a separate line of research (Courty and Pagliero, 2006 ) and we do not find negative demand responses to an increase in the responsiveness parameter.
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Finally, our study does not address welfare issues. In order to compute the welfare gains from responsive pricing, one needs to model consumer behavior in the presence of congestion externalities. In principle, the welfare gain from demand smoothing could be high since unused capacity and rationing are likely to take place under fixed pricing. The contribution of this work is to show that demand smoothing, the mechanism behind Vickrey's proposal, does work in practice. The next step would be to incorporate welfare calculations and investigate, for example, how welfare depends on the responsiveness parameter. Regime 12
Price (FF/hour)
Q0
Note: The figure reports linear approximations of the pricing curves (see Table 1 ). The price is measured in French Francs / hour. The occupancy rate is the hourly average number of used computers divided by the total number of computers in the store. Note: The figure reports linear approximations of the pricing curves (see Table 1 ). The price is measured in French Francs / hour. The occupancy rate is the hourly average number of used computers divided by the total number of computers in the store. Note: The figure compares pairs of regimes for which the difference in responsiveness is larger than 22. This singles out 11 pairs: regimes 1 to 9 crossed with regime 12, and regimes 10 and 11 crossed with regime 1. The comparison of regime 8 and 12 is reported in Figure 2 . Each pricing function in our sample is represented at least once. The vertical axis denotes the fraction of hourly observations for which the occupancy rate is below the corresponding level reported on the horizontal axis. The occupancy rate is the hourly average number of used computers divided by the total number of computers in the store. Note: The occupancy rate is the hourly average number of used computers divided by the total number of computers in the store.
Responsiveness is the slope of the pricing function. The predicted quantile correspond to Thursday, with no national holiday. Note: The occupancy rate is the hourly average number of used computers divided by the total number of computers in the store. Responsiveness is the slope of the pricing function. Note: The responsiveness of each pricing regime is measured by the slope of the pricing curve; the slope is estimated by regressing (OLS) the price in each step on the occupancy rate at the midpoint of each step (the R 2 is reported in parentheses); in estimating the slope of the pricing curves we do not consider occupancy levels that are not reached in the sample. "S.d. occupancy rate" and "s.d. price" are the standard deviation of the observed occupancy rate and price. The table includes observations for hours between 8 am and 12 pm. (2), for the 5th, 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th and 90th percentile of the occupancy distribution. The independent variables are regime specific indicator variables (regime 1 omitted). Bootstrap standard errors (with 20 replications) are reported in parentheses. The number of observations is 2,312. The results for the other deciles of the distribution are reported in the Additional Material Section. * Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. Note: the table reports the F-test and P-value for the equality of the 5th, 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th and 90th percentile of the occupancy distribution for pairs of regimes. The tests are based on the estimates in Table 2 . The table does not report the F-tests for the pairs of regimes (1, 12) and (1, 11) because such comparison can be performed using the results in Table  2 . The results for the other deciles of the distribution are reported in the Additional Material Section. 1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9. Responsiveness is the slope of the pricing curve in each regime. The coefficients for the level of the pricing function (with hour interactions), hour of the day, day of the week, holiday periods, and weekend cycle are not reported in the table. The number of observations is 2312. Bootstrap standard errors (with 20 replications) are reported in parentheses. * Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. Note: The table reports the test for equality of variance across pairs of regimes. The test is the ratio of the variance of price for the column regime and the row regime. The degrees of freedom (N 1 -1, N 2 -1) can be computed for each test using the number of observations for each regime in Table 1 . P-values are reported in parenthesis. (2), for the 5th percentile and the 9 deciles of the occupancy distribution. The independent variables are regime specific indicator variables (regime 1 omitted). Bootstrap standard errors (with 20 replications) are reported in parentheses. The number of observations is 2,312. * Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. Note: the table reports the F-test and P-value for the equality of the 5th percentile and the 9 deciles of the occupancy distribution for pairs of regimes. The tests are based on the estimates in Table A2 . The table does not report the F-tests for the pairs of regimes (1, 12) and (1, 11) because such comparison can be performed using the results in Table 2 . Note: The dependent variable is the quantile q y of the occupancy rate distribution (%), y=0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9. Responsiveness is the slope of the pricing curve in each regime. The coefficients for the level of the pricing function (with hour interactions), hour of the day, day of the week, holiday periods, and weekend cycle are not reported in the table. The number of observations in the sample is 2312. Bootstrap standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
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